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1. Introduction

The Cooperative Research Centres (CRC) program is the Australian
Government’s largest single investment in cross-sector R&D. The Centres are
archetypal ‘triple helix’ structures: highly complex inter-organizational
networks involving universities, federal and State (provincial) government
research agencies, individual firms, and various industry-led public sector
intermediaries.
Over 15 years the CRC has become established as the dominant
organizational model for cross-sector collaborative R&D in Australia, albeit
one that is now being challenged by alternative arrangements for research
collaboration. Thus, the CRC program has not only become entrenched in the
national research system but is also a driving force in research policy debates.
CRCs are widely credited with ‘changing research cultures’ and promoting
increased and more effective cross-sectoral, multidisciplinary and multiorganizational research, technology development and commercialisation. The
triple helix, in this form, carries the potential to transform the character of the
public sector institutional participants of the CRCs – the universities and
government laboratories – with significant implications for national innovation
policy.

Our study examines the impact of the CRC program at three levels:

1. We assess the experience of public sector researchers and research
managers within the CRCs. Until our survey, little empirical evidence
existed on how researchers themselves perceived and managed the risks
and rewards of participation in cross-sector R&D centres in Australia. We
consider what drives a researcher to become involved in (and to stay
committed to) the complex collaborative environment of a CRC.

2. Based on participants’ experience, we then identify the key management
issues that have arisen within the CRCs and the ways that the public
research institutions – universities and government research agencies –
have responded to the difficulties of collaboration within the CRCs.
2
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3. Lastly, we briefly speculate more broadly on the role of the CRCs in the
structure of the research and innovation system, and how our findings
might inform policy choices in relation to the organization of collaborative
R&D.

2. The Australian Cooperative Research Centres Program

The Australian Cooperative Research Centres (CRC) Program is the largest
cross-sector R&D program in Australia, with about A$200 million annually in
federal government funding. CRCs were first funded in 1990, following the
example of centres like the US NSF Engineering Research Centers and the
UK Science and Engineering Research Council’s Interdisciplinary Research
Centres in the mid 1980s. Over the life of program, 158 centres have been
established: 100 of these were new, and 58 were formed from existing CRCs
(Productivity Commission, 2007). There are currently (2006-07) 57 CRCs in
operation, covering a wide range of industrially-oriented research (such as
polymers or advanced automotive technology) and ‘public good’ research
(such as Aboriginal health or greenhouse gas accounting), each funded for an
initial seven-year term (renewable, subject to competition, where a
significantly new research is proposed). CRCs span a wide range of science,
engineering and health fields.
CRCs are fairly typical ‘triple helix’ arrangements: institutionally
distributed organizations that rely on the voluntary cooperation of independent
partners within a contractual framework. They involve collaboration between
universities, federal and state (provincial) government research agencies,
individual firms and various industry-led public sector intermediaries. They
sometimes engage a chief executive and administrative and R&D staff in a
central office, but most CRC researchers are employed by their university,
business or government laboratory where they continue to work, rather than
by the CRC itself. CRCs, like other industry-linked research centres can
become highly complex inter-organizational networks. For example, the CRC
for Polymers – now in its third round of 7-year funding – combines 11
participant companies in the plastics industry (two of which are spin-off
3
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companies from the CRC!), two large federal government research agencies,
10 universities, a state government department and another independent
cross-sector R&D centre.
What is perhaps different about Australia’s CRCs compared with crosssector R&D centres in other countries is firstly the strong involvement of the
government research sector, particularly the CSIRO, Australia’s largest
federal research organization. Government (federal and state) is therefore
represented not just by facilitation and finance, but by day to day participation
as a partner in the research program of most CRCs. Indeed, enhancing
collaboration between the CSIRO and the universities in doctoral supervision
and shared research facilities was an important founding rationale for the
CRC Program. The role of the CSIRO undoubtedly influenced the original
structure of the centres, in particular the goal to:
enable each participating group to retain its separate institutional affiliation, but each
Centre to constitute a collaborative integrated research team’ (Slatyer, 1993; 1994)

This dominance by the government research sector is changing however.
CSIRO has declined as a research performer (at least relative to the
universities) (Garrett-Jones, 2007). As its government budget has declined
CSIRO has engaged in a more collaborative approach to its own research
programs with the establishment of a range of ‘Flagship’ programs, and its
own grants for collaboration with CSIRO.
While Program objectives have from the outset promoted ‘the links
between research and its commercial and other applications’ (Slatyer, 1994),
the current objectives have ‘drifted significantly’ from the original ones
(Howard Partners, 2003) with the government insisting on a more commercial
focus for the CRCs. In the initial rounds of CRCs an industry partner was
‘strongly encouraged’ but not mandatory (Cooperative Research Centres
Committee, 1991). While the Program continues an ‘academic’ (proposal
driven) mode of funding awarded on the quality of their research, on their
partners and on their strategies for application, in 2004 the government
announced that the CRC Program would have ‘a stronger commercial focus’
through strong industry partners and plans for commercialisation or utilisation.i
CRCs therefore share many of the features of their counterparts in
other countries. They differ from programs like the US Engineering Research

4
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Centres in covering a broader spectrum of research; in having more the
character of ‘virtual institutes’ (researchers largely remain employed by their
‘home’ organization, not by CRC itself); and in many cases (despite an
original intention of research concentration) by being widely distributed
geographically across Australia.

3. Methods and data

We draw empirical evidence from a survey of 370 respondents from public
sector organizations involved with CRCs carried out in 2005. The written,
mixed-mode (postal and web-based) ‘Research Culture’ survey covered a
non-random but representative sample of people involved in the management
and conduct of CRC-based research (Diment and Garrett-Jones, 2007).
Respondents comprised researchers and research managers involved either
directly as participants in one or more CRCs or indirectly with CRCs (e.g.
responsible for managing some aspect of the organization’s involvement in
the CRC). Analysis of in-depth interviews with around 30 research managers
from university and other public sector partners of selected CRCs (GarrettJones et al., 2005a) was used (a) to develop a structured questionnaire for the
survey, and (b) to refine a sampling strategy for the survey. The survey was
also informed by related research on the career paths of scientists in Australia
(Turpin and Garrett-Jones, 2003; Turpin et al., 2005) and on a review of
appropriate research performance indicators for the CRCs (Garrett-Jones and
Turpin, 2002).
The survey achieved a 34 per cent response rate. The distribution of
the respondents by their institutional affiliation is shown in Table 1.
Respondents comprised researchers and research managers from 37 CRCs,
most of whom were involved directly as formal participants. The majority (53
per cent) of respondents identified themselves as from the higher education
(HE) sector, with 21 per cent from the government research (GR) sector (see
Table 1). The respondent set was quite homogeneous: 82 per cent of the
respondents were men, 77 per cent held a doctoral degree, and 11 per cent
held a masters degree. Two-thirds of the respondents had participated in one

5
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CRC only, while the rest had been involved with between two and seven
CRCs.
The survey questionnaire presented 48 propositions about the
respondent’s experience with the CRC program, under four headings:
1. the benefits of CRC participation to the respondent and their
organization;
2. the problems encountered;
3. the management strategies adopted for participation; and
4. the effect of CRC participation on research training and career
structures.
Respondents were invited to rate each proposition on a six-point Likert scale.
A ‘Not applicable’ response was also allowed. The final question (optional) in
each section allowed an open-ended response to each theme. More than half
of the respondents answered at least one of these open-ended questions.
The survey results permit a quantitative ranking of the main benefits
and problems in CRC participation; the management strategies adopted; and
the effect of CRC participation on research careers. They allow comparisons,
for example, of the views of .participants from the university and government
research sectors (Garrett-Jones et al., 2005b). Information was also collected
on the respondents’ position, length of time in the CRC and years since
graduation. Responses to open-ended questions in the survey convey the
‘CRC experience’ in the participants’ own words (Garrett-Jones et al., 2006)
and help to illuminate and interpret their quantitative responses on a range of
management issues.
The current paper summarises and extends our main findings from the
quantitative and qualitative results of the survey in order to allow comparisons
with survey data from other cross-sector R&D collaborations.

6
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Table 1. Demography of survey respondents

Sector of
employment

CRC
(CC)

Higher
Education
(HE)

Government
Research
(GR)

Government
other
(GO)

Other
(OT)

Total

Number of
respondents

34

196

78

43

19

370

Proportion of
respondents

9.2%

53.0%

21.1%

11.6%

5.2%

100.0%

Number of
respondents
answering openended questions

18

108

45

23

12

209

Proportion of
respondents
answering openended questions

8.6%

51.7%

21.5%

11.0%

5.7%

100.0%

4. Results

The results below are drawn firstly from Table 2, which shows the mean score
of responses for selected questions in the survey and the proportion of
response in the ‘Agree/Strongly Agree’ and ‘Disagree/Strongly Disagree’
categories. It excludes responses of ‘Slightly Agree’ and ‘Slightly Disagree’.
The table thus shows those questions that elicited the strongest opinions from
the greatest number of respondents. Second, we draw upon a previous
comparison of responses from government researchers and academics where
these differ significantly (Garrett-Jones et al., 2005b). Third, we draw upon
comments made by respondents in response to the open-ended questions in
the survey (Garrett-Jones et al., 2006) in order to illuminate the findings from
the questions in Table 2.
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(1)
(2)

D4
D2

D12

D3
D8

D9

D13

D7

D5

C6

C10

C7

4.4

348

3.7
2.9
2.9

359

3.8

321
348
331

3.9
3.9

3.9

3.9

4.1

3.9

4.4

316
350

341

322

330

340

344

4.4

5.0
4.6
4.6

362
362
348

350

5.1

Mean
score (2)

368

n (1)

Excluding responses of ‘not applicable’ and missing values
Responses were given values on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) through to 6 (Strongly Agree)

Commercial requirements for improved project management and agreed
timelines are beneficial for researchers in my organization.
My department/institution appears to be subsidising my involvement in
the CRC.
My views are adequately represented on the CRC Board and its
committees.
It is difficult to change our level of commitment to CRC as circumstances
change.
Industry participants in the CRC are too intent on short-term objectives.
My conditions of employment (e.g. workload model, performance
agreement) do not adequately reflect the time I need to devote to the
CRC.
I feel I have an appropriate degree of influence over decisions made by
the CRC.
Industry led research projects in the CRC are not sufficiently challenging.
University partners have too much say in shaping the research directions
of the CRC.

I am proud to be associated with the CRC.
My work associated with the CRC complements my other professional
activities and responsibilities closely.
The multi-centre model of the CRC enhances collaboration.
Involvement in the CRC improves the cohesion of my research team.
The commercial partners in the CRC give an important focus to my
research objectives.
CRC funds are an important source of external finance which my
organization uses to leverage other funding.
Engagement in the CRC offers an avenue for bringing technology
concepts to fruition that would be difficult to achieve by other means.
The CRC gives me essential access to research facilities and equipment
in the other participant organizations.

C1
C4
C3
C2
C8

Proposition

No

Table 2. Selected responses from the survey

11%

43%
15%

40%

42%
36%

45%

45%

49%

40%

55%

57%

57%

78%
69%
61%

79%

46%

28%
50%

31%

21%
21%

23%

27%

13%

26%

15%

16%

15%

4%
12%
10%

4%

Agree+ Disagree+
Strongly Strongly
Agree Disagree
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Participants in the CRC need to be fully represented on the Board.
The CEO is the lynch pin of the success of the CRC.
The ability and experience of the individual Board members determine
the CRC' s success.
My organization has developed a specific management regime for
CRCs.
My colleagues in the CRC are more important to me than those
elsewhere.
The CRC operates much like any academic department.
Performance measures adopted for the CRC have caused my
organization to change the way it reports research outputs.
It is productive for postgraduate students to be supervised jointly by
academics and researchers from government research organizations.
It is productive for postgraduate students to be supervised jointly by
academic and industry researchers.
CRC participation has improved the way I work with industry partners
generally.
CRC participation has been a positive influence in redirecting my
research activities.
My work with the CRC has enhanced my career prospects generally.
CRC participation has reduced my interaction with students and
research staff outside the CRC.
CRC participation has increased my potential for ARC / NHMRC
research grant funding.

E6
E5
E7

F2

(1)
(2)

F12

F7
F10

F9

F8

F1

E4
E2

E9

E1

2.8

3.0

320
252

4.1
4.1

4.1

5.0

320
336

341

350

5.1

2.8

307
352

2.9
2.8

339
354

3.8

4.2

350
315

4.4
4.3

2.7

2.8

Mean
score (2)

347
350

329

329

n (1)

Excluding responses of ‘not applicable’ and missing values
Responses were given values on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) through to 6 (Strongly Agree)

The research objectives of the CRC have distorted research priorities in
other parts of my organization.
There is too much competition between CRC staff and others at my
institution.

D11
D10

Proposition

No

Table 2. Selected responses from the survey (cont.)

15%

16%

44%
45%

43%

78%

83%

12%

15%
13%

40%

48%

61%
55%

14%

12%

52%

47%

18%
18%

16%

4%

2%

55%

49%
46%

25%

14%

19%
15%

57%

56%

Agree+ Disagree+
Strongly Strongly
Agree Disagree
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4.1 The rewards of CRC participation

As Table 2 shows, respondents provided a strong endorsement of the benefits
of participation in the CRCs. An overwhelming majority expressed pride in their
CRC membership (Proposition C1 in Table 2), saw it as complementing their
other professional work (C4), and enhancing collaboration (C3). A majority also
valued the effect of the CRC on the cohesion of their research team (C2), and
as an avenue for technology development that was not otherwise available
(C10). Nearly half of the respondents felt that the CRC’s impact on improved
project management was beneficial (D5). More tangibly a majority viewed the
CRC Program as an important source of research funds (C7) and (for a
substantial minority of respondents) the CRCs provided access to essential
research facilities in other organizations (C6).
Academic (HE) and government research (GR) respondents differed
significantly on two propositions. HE respondents rated professional and
administrative support from the CRC (C5 - not shown in Table 2) as more
important that did GR respondents. Further, while both agreed with the
proposition that the CRC complemented their professional activities (C4), there
was a significant difference in the distribution of responses with the HE
respondents being less unanimous in their agreement.
In the open-ended questions, respondents nominated both material and
intangible benefit in membership of their CRC: ‘my association with the CRC
has been extremely beneficial and rewarding and I can think of few downsides
to my participation in the CRC’ (GR-358)ii; ‘it is one of the best things that has
happened for me’ (GR-61); ‘money for continuing research activities - the chase
for the dollar!’ (HE-343), with ‘greater stability and longer-term funding’ (HE337) than available elsewhere; for particular activities such as ‘opportunities for
conference attendance/workshop participation not otherwise supported by my
organization’ (GO-356); funds for staff and ‘generous PhD scholarships’ (GR90). ‘I got a real good (well two) student PhDs’ wrote HE-311.
However, most benefits reported were intangible, most notably the value
of relations with researchers in their own field and in other disciplines: ‘working
with peers from other organizations whom I respect’ (CC-118); a ‘widened
fraternity of scientists with similar interest/goals’ (GR-263); or simply ‘access to
10
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ideas’ (GR-307). These contacts were either unavailable through their
organization more difficult to arrange:
opportunity to work within a team with similar research interests and opportunities for
cross-fertilisation and collaboration with other researchers. If I weren’t associated with
the CRC I would be working mostly in isolation. (HE-222)

Several respondents commented on ‘closer relations with industry’ (HE-152)
and provision of a business or commercial focus for their research: one gained
a ‘wider view of my research area, especially with respect to application of
results in industry’ (OT-140). In short, many respondents saw a significant cost
in not being part of a CRC as it provided an otherwise missing element to the
their ‘scientific context’, including application of their research.
We asked several questions on the effects of CRC participation on the
career opportunities for individual researchers and research students.
Respondents overwhelmingly endorsed as productive the joint supervision of
postgraduate students by academic and industry researchers (F1) and by
academic and government researchers (F2). A large minority of respondents in
Table 2 felt that CRC participation had enhanced their career prospects
generally (F7), improved the way they worked with industry partners (F8) and
provided a positive influence on redirecting their research (F9). Respondents
were more equivocal about whether it had improved their prospects of internal
promotion (F6 – not shown). The HE group slightly disagreed that the CRC had
enhanced their prospects for promotion within their university (F6) whereas the
GR group felt that CRC involvement had slightly benefited their prospect of
internal promotion.
Respondents commented on benefit related to their own careers and
capabilities in the following terms: assisting with ‘career progression’ (GR-134);
‘greatly increased scope and confidence of use in applying for senior jobs’ (HE272); or for others, ‘networking and identification of other commercial/clinical
areas have re-focused my research career’ (GR-229); ‘better understanding of
IP management and commercialisation’ (CC-360); and ‘Got me to work more
efficiently (to meet deadlines)’ (HE-312).
Team cohesion was also mentioned: a ‘means of uniting the interests of
departmental members who would otherwise have quite disparate interests’
(HE-215); and ‘the program gives a strong strategic focus for a major research
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group in [my organization]’ (GR-231). Status and recognition within the
organization has resulted: ‘a useful lever to get better support within my
organization’. (GR-138) commented another.
In

summary,

respondents

generally

agreed

in

regarding

their

participation in CRCs as very valuable in providing both material and intangible
rewards. The material rewards (e.g. funding) were ranked less highly than the
less tangible: these latter included improvement in their interaction with the
scientific community; the perspectives that researchers in other disciplines and
institutions bring to their research; the view of ‘different ways of doing things’
that interaction with commercial firms gave to their research; or attracting high
quality research students to their team. Significantly – in their open-ended
responses - they couched the benefits in terms of advantage to their research
group and their research careers rather than to their organization as a whole.
Respondents are taking what we might term a strongly academic, scientific and
personal perspective on the benefits of CRC membership.

4. 2 The problems and risks of CRC participation

The survey tested a range of propositions about potential problems with
membership of a CRC that had been raised in initial interviews with participants.
These included issues such as short-termism or a lack of intellectual challenge
in industry-related projects, publication restrictions, isolation from other
colleagues who were not in the CRC, distortion of organizational goals or a
disjunction between reward systems, and lack of adequate return on
investment. Unlike the common consensus we found on benefits, there was no
widespread agreement by respondents on the problems and risks of
participation in CRCs.
A substantial minority of respondents in Table 2 felt some disjunct
between their ‘home’ employment and the demands of the CRC (D8); that their
institutions was subsidising (inappropriately or appropriately – we are not sure;
we meant above and beyond their contractual commitment!) their involvement
in the CRC (D7); that there was a degree of ‘lock-in’ to the CRC projects which
might restrict an appropriate change of direction by participants (D9); and that
industry participants were too intent on short-term objectives (D3).
12
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In contrast, another set of possible issues was rejected as important by
around half of the respondents and supported by only a small minority. CRC
participation had not reduced the respondents’ interaction with other students
and research staff (F10); nor had the CRC distorted their organization’s
research priorities (D11) nor led to undue competition with their ‘home’
colleagues (D10)). In particular, the proposition that industry projects lacked
challenge (D4) was strongly rejected. Responses to other questions on
scholarly publication (F11 – not shown), and limiting opportunities for
fundamental research (F13 – not shown) were more equivocal, suggesting that
there were significant for some participants.
What this tells us is that there are no overriding problems in the
organization and management of the CRCs, but that particular issues are
important or even crucial for some participants. For example only a small
minority of respondents agreed that the CRC had any positive effect on their
gaining research council grants (F12), and over half of the respondents to the
question disagreed/strongly disagreed. This was a question where the
responses of the higher education (HE) and government researchers (GR)
differed significantly. Further, the HE group slightly disagreed that CRC
participation had increased their opportunities for scholarly publication. This
leads us to suggest that some HE researchers are experiencing difficulty in
reconciling their role within the CRC with the drivers of career advancement in
the university and success in peer reviewed academic research council grants
(Garrett-Jones et al., 2005b).

4.3 Managing the expectations of participants

The results from the quantitative propositions suggest that in a minority
of cases at least the expectations of individual members with regard is not being
met by the CRC and its participant organizations. Comments made in response
to our open-ended questions in the survey showed that respondents potentially
regard as negative anything – like publication restrictions – which impinged on
their research activity and output.
As Lee (2000) observes (p. 132) a sustainable collaboration is one where
each partner allows the other to realise their objectives, while also contributing
13
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to mutual goals. We interpret the problems that arise in the management of
CRCs firstly in terms of the heterogeneity of the cultures and functional domains
involved and the potential for competition between them (Garrett-Jones et al.,
2006). For example, the reward structures of the parent organization and the
CRC may not be aligned, or scientists may find the commercial imperatives of
industry too short-term. Second is a problem of coordination and governance in
a multi-institutional environment where the partners and individual researchers
essentially remain free-agents.
Below we explore participants’ participants’ expectations under three
headings: transaction costs, governance and conflict, and building and
maintaining trust between participants. These are linked as each is susceptible
to good or bad management. It is quite possible that the comments of our
respondents may focus on the more negative experiences within CRCs. What is
worrying however is that a substantial minority of respondents indicated that
their organization had not developed a specific management regime for their
involvement in CRCs (E1), implying that such issues were not being specifically
assessed and addressed.

4.3.1 Transaction costs

Managing a complex interorganizational network such as a CRC carries
substantial overheads. While we received an equivocal response to the
question about whether CRCs were ‘too bureaucratic’ (D14 – not shown in
Table 2), many respondents regarded administrative overheads as both
unnecessary and as more onerous than with alternative forms of research
support. ‘Transaction costs are very high’ (GR-230) was a typical response
when asked about problems with the management of the CRC. Other
commented: ‘more forms, more paperwork, more reviews’ (GR-125); ‘there is a
large administrative cost linking different institutions’ (HE-141); ‘I was frustrated
by how cumbersome the CRC was’ (GR-100); and ‘dual reporting needs’ (GO164). ‘Compared to an ARC grant, a CRC has a much greater administrative
cost and suffers from the possibility that the funds can be altered through the
life of a project’ said one academic (HE-141).

14
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We wondered why respondents found administration so frustrating and
burdensome First, they saw little benefit flowing back to themselves or their
research groups: ‘unnecessary forms, timesheets etc. with no management
feedback even to project leaders; so seems pointless’ (HE-121). Second, the
politicking and management distracted them from their main concern of carrying
out research: ‘massive percentage of funds spent on administration rather than
research’ (HE-335); ‘the CRC reporting requirements strongly impinge upon
research time and activities’ (HE-3). Other comments included: ‘too much
money spent on “organization” — meetings etc… Not enough for research.
CRCs should be about research’ (HE-200); or the ‘focus is not on research’
(HE-254). Ultimately, this could lead to frustration and individual reaction:
‘my attempts to maintain an external collaboration tore me apart (double management
reporting presentation etc) so much that I am leaving this job with the CRC to take a
regular funded position overseas with clean and simple funding provided + 30% salary
increase’ (HE-52).

4.3.2 Governance structures

One reason why inter-organizational networks like CRCs encourage innovation
is by bringing together people with a greater ‘cognitive distance’ (CD) between
them (Nooteboom, 2000). A large CD has the merit of bringing in new ideas, but
also creates problems of incomprehensibility. The partners will have different
views — not just about the science of the project, but, as Gibbons et al. (1994)
point out, also what constitutes ‘fair play’. Siegel et al. (2001) (p. 5) succinctly
identify the management issue in cross-sector R&D arrangements:
A critical organizational issue is how universities and firms manage these relationships,
in light of the fact that the key players in [university-industry technology transfer] (i.e.,
scientists, university administrators, and firms entrepreneurs) have different motives
and incentives and operate in different organizational cultures.

We also need to question what is regarded as legitimate competition,
collaboration, ownership and reward (Gibbons et al., 1994), and how objectives
and strategies are defined and implemented (Steenhuis and Gray, 2006). This
raises the question of what is the appropriate balance between trust and ‘formal
government’ (Menard, 2004) required to coordinate cross-sector R&D
organizations, and what ‘governance’ and rules are accepted and enforced.
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CRCs are not ‘cooperatives’ in the sense of being member-based,
democratically controlled organizations. But they start this way, recruiting
voluntary participants in the bid for grant funding and we found that this
cooperative thinking permeates the participants’ continuing expectations. The
majority of respondents in Table 2 agreed on the importance of fully
representative governance for the CRC (E6), while acknowledging the roles of
the CEO and board members in the CRC’s success (E5 and E7). In contrast
only a minority ‘agreed/strongly agreed’ that their views were adequately
represented on the CRC governing boards (D13) or that they had enough
influence over decisions by the CRC (D12). Indeed, a substantial minority of
respondents ‘disagreed/strongly disagreed’ that they had an adequate say.
Comments we received showed that the respondents expect a strong
voice in the strategy and running of the CRC and that they were unhappy when
they were not consulted and involved: ‘I do not have much say in the affairs of
CRC. I know I have the capacity to contribute more but no takers’ (GR-31). ‘We
get told what to do!’ (HE-264).
In a voluntary alliance like a CRC the participants expect to be ‘justly’
treated if they are to remain a member. Daellenbach and Davenport (2004)
assess the role of distributive justice (fair allocation of outcomes and rewards)
and procedural justice (fair handling of processes, such as decision making,
agreement on procedural norms, conflict resolution and governance) in the
establishment of technology alliances involving firms and public sector research
institutes. They note that how these elements of governance are dealt with is
crucial to the building of trust within the collaboration.

4.3.3 Building trust

Holland and Lockett (1998) describe the coalescence of virtual organizations
around outcomes, and the need to deal with the risk that the outcome may not
be achieved: ‘there is a significant level of risk associated with the outcome…
and organizational trust has been hypothesised to be an explanatory variable
for the development of such cooperative behaviour’ (p. 606). To Daellenbach
and Davenport (2004) ‘it reflects the expectation that partners will act
competently and recognize and protect the interests of other alliance members’
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Proc. of Triple Helix VI: 6th Intl. Conf. on University, Industry & Government Linkages

(p. 189). In R&D, academic science is built on trust in the quality and validity of
research performed, which is ensured through public sharing of knowledge
(Liebeskind and Oliver, 1998). This raises the questions of how partners are
selected (Daellenbach and Davenport, 2004), how participants assess trust and
reputation (and its breach), how trust is built and how the risk of opportunist
behaviour between partners can be reduced.
Nooteboom (2000) recognizes two elements of trust: competence (or the
capability to deliver the agreed outcomes) and intention (the degree to which
parties are committed to the avowed goals and avoid opportunism — that is,
putting self-interest above the goals of the centre). Daellenbach and Davenport
(2004) quoting Williams refer to ability, integrity and benevolence and affect as
elements of trust.
What we found from respondents comments is that trust between
partners in the CRC was similarly expressed both in terms of scientific
competence (ability) and commitment (integrity/benevolence). Competence
expressed itself particularly in respondents’ assessment of the quality of the
researchers in the collaboration: ‘this can result in a lot of “B” researchers doing
quite limited work’ (HE-7); or ‘company members supply their second-level staff’
(HE-121). They were critical of the CRC failing to enrol the best researcher:
The university with the most knowledge may not necessarily be working on the project.
Who is doing the work is more likely to be the uni that initiates the proposal (GO-37).

Failings by other partners resulting in ‘competition at the expense of
collaboration’ (HE-199) were generally interpreted in terms of the party’s selfinterest and lack of commitment, rather than their incapacity: ‘some institutions
are NOT “cooperative”,’ said one (HE-253); ‘certain individuals from other
academic institutions [forgot] that the first “C” stands for cooperative’ (HE-79).
Others commented on the ‘failure of some researchers to collaborate openly
and fairly’ (HE-386).
In summary, respondents lost faith in their partners when they were: (1)
viewed as poor quality researchers, (2) viewed as incapable of delivering
knowledge, results or feedback, or (3) seemed to lack commitment to the ethos
of cooperation or were perceived to be pursuing their own ends. Two factors
commonly mentioned that led to this lack of trust were: (1) inadequate
commitment of resources (usually people and money) — either actual or
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perceived (or unverifiable), and (2) domination of or undue influence on the
direction of the collaboration or of the potential rewards. The way that CRCs
were structured made it difficult for partners to assess whether each other was
‘pulling their weight’: ‘costing models between partners are wildly different and
project budgeting is a major source of mistrust’ (GR-96) said one government
researcher. Reneging on commitments was also viewed seriously by an
academic respondent: ‘ensuring in-kind contributions match commitments’ (HE184); ‘commitment of individual staff is low … and over-ridden by host institution
priorities’ (HE-89). ‘Inflexible and one-sided IP arrangements’ (GR-123) were
also viewed with distrust as a form of self-interest.
If we can summarise the expectations of public sector researchers in our
survey it is that: ‘CRCs should be truly cooperative, CRCs should be about first
class research’!

5. Discussion: Managing expectations in cross-sector R&D centres

The ‘culture survey’ of attitudes among 370 public sector participants in the
Australian CRCs contributes to understanding not only the management issues
within CRCs but to the management of cross-sector R&D collaboration in
general. As (Lee, 2000) comments:
With respect to the sustainability of collaboration, empirical research is in short supply.
If we are to have a realistic understanding of whether the concept of university-industry
collaboration can be a vital and sustainable component of the national innovation
system, we need to have a good knowledge base of what each sector is actually getting
out of their collaboration.

In comparing the CRC survey results with similar work elsewhere, several
factors may be relevant. First is the national and institutional context. As noted,
there may be ‘local’ reasons why cross-sector R&D centres have been
established or organized in a particular way. We have already pointed to the
importance of the government research sector in the Australian context and the
need to accommodate powerful organizations like CSIRO. The Canadian
Networks of Centres of Excellence, which have many parallels to the Australian
CRCs. were set up in 1988 by the federal government, both independent of the
powerful National Research Council and ‘enabling the federal government to
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circumvent university power and autonomy and provincial jurisdiction’ (AtkinsonGrosjean et al., 2001; Fisher et al., 2001). The CRC Program was deliberately
setup up as a ‘different way’ of funding research and was initially set up in the
Prime Minister’s portfolio, not under either of the research councils or the
industry ministry. A ‘local’ problem which has arisen from these arrangements is
the effect of CRC Program funding on access to research council grants. It is
difficult for researchers to obtain funding from both sources for projects that are
viewed as related.
Second, the precise organizational form of the collaboration is also
important. In the early stages of the program, many CRCs were relatively loose
networks and unincorporated (i.e. not a legal entity, and unable to enter into
contracts for licensing technologies etc). The government now requires the
incorporation of almost all CRCs. By comparison with some other universityindustry centres, the CRCs do not directly employ or second many of their
researchers and do not concentrate their researchers in a single location.
We consider that the basic drivers of collaboration and the benefits
reported by public sector researchers in the CRC are likely to be common
among all cross-sector R&D centres. Of the management issues that arise,
some will be a common feature of cross-sector R&D organizations, some will
pertain only to the specific arrangements in the Australian CRCs, and some will
be restricted to individual CRCs and participant institutions.
While we have not attempted a census of comparable surveys
internationally we briefly review two surveys of university researchers that
appear to produce findings similar to own. Several studies examine the value of
participation in cross-sector R&D centres for business participants (Adams et
al., 2001; Feller et al., 2002). Fewer examine closely the benefits for the
university faculty members and government researchers.
As Lee (2000) points out, university researchers would not engage with
industry unless they felt that the collaboration brought them significant and
important benefits. Lee’s survey of 427 faculty members in US universities who
were engaged in R&D projects with industry showed a range of motives for
collaborating with industry. Among the benefits he identifies for university
researchers are: funding for research and scholarships, insight through practical
application of research, experience relevant to teaching, job placement or
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Proc. of Triple Helix VI: 6th Intl. Conf. on University, Industry & Government Linkages

business opportunities, and furthering the mission of the university. The material
benefits of funding for research staff or equipment were most highly regarded,
as were the intangible benefits relating to gaining insight into ones own
research and testing applications of theory. Expectations were generally
realised as benefits in Lee’s study: a majority of faculty members experienced
‘substantial and considerable benefits to their academic research dimension’ (p.
121). Other motivations such as seeking entrepreneurship, jobs for their
students, or furthering the university’s mission were not nearly as important to
them.
Most of the collaborations in Lee’s study involved a project with a single
firm: only a quarter of the faculty members were involved in a formal universityindustry research centre. However, Lee’s findings on the benefits of
collaboration to academic researchers accord quite closely with those from the
survey of researchers in the Australian CRCs. The Australian respondents
placed less import on the material benefit of funding, probably because
research funding in Australian universities (and of course in government labs,
which were not surveyed by Lee) is not as wholly dependent on direct grants as
are US universities. In particular, our findings lead to strongly endorse Lee’s
comment:
First and foremost, faculty members who participate in industry-sponsored research
have their own research agendas … The most important motivational consideration for
them is to complement their academic research agenda. (Lee, 2000)(pp. 120-1)

Recent work by Dietz and Bozeman (2005) compares the career paths and
achievements of 1200 US academic scientists working in industry-linked
research centres, contrasting those who have worked solely in academia with
those who have followed ‘non-traditional’ paths involving work in industry or
government. They suggest that the research centres are having measurable
impact on the research careers of engineers and scientists and, consequently,
on the culture of the universities that employ them. Dietz and Bozeman
hypothesise that, for academic scientists, ‘intersectoral changes in jobs
throughout the career will provide access to new social networks, resulting in
higher productivity’ (p. 353). They also note that ‘job diversity [is] associated
with increased collaboration’ (p. 353). What Dietz and Bozeman neglect to infer
is that working within such a centre can be a substitute for, and perhaps ‘safer’
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option than actually taking a job within industry, and yet still provide benefits in
terms of access to ‘new social networks and scientific and technical human
capital’ (p. 349). This is borne out by the frequent comment of the researchers
in our study that one of the most valuable aspects of CRC membership is
through extension of their research networks and access to new networks of
researchers and research users. Dietz and Bozeman’s, (2005) observation that
academic research careers are changing in a fundamental way appears valid.
Our work provides support for their evidence that ‘the opportunity provided to
build S&T human capital’ (p.362) is one of the attractors of the new career path.

6. The role of CRCs in the research system

If the important contribution of cross-sectoral collaborative R&D centres is to be
retained without damage to the science and innovation system as a whole the
‘academic’ and ‘scientific’ foundations of innovation which underpin the
expectations of our respondents must be nurtured not eroded. This requires
management and policy initiatives which better recognise and sustain the
knowledge resources – the scientific networks and careers of individual
researchers – on which CRCs rely.
Our survey reveals no overriding management concerns with the CRCs.
However, the critical comments made by a substantial number of our
respondents in relation to management of their collaboration imply room for
improvement in the management of some CRCs. Many CRCs are clearly
‘getting it right’ for the great majority of their participants and could promulgate
‘best practice’ for other centres. The management of CRCs involves not only
the governance of the CRC itself but an articulation with the practices of the
participant organizations. We therefore view with concern the finding that many
organizations had not developed a specific management regime for their
involvement in CRCs.
Finally, the national policy debate on the role of CRCs in Australia is
proceeding without a proper consideration of what drives and sustains the
public sector participants. A recent report from the federal government’s
influential Productivity Commission concludes ‘[t]he complete shift to industryfocused CRCs is inappropriate’ (Productivity Commission, 2007). However, it
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draws this conclusion not out of any expressed concern for the scientific basis
of CRCs, but because ‘current costsharing arrangements do not appear to
reflect the distribution of benefits from the program, with potentially large
subsidies available to business partners’. This debate has played out before.
Ten years ago the ‘Mortimer Report’ was especially critical of schemes which
produced ‘private benefit’ for firms and recommended the termination of CRCs
which fell into this category and retention of the CRC Program only for ‘public
good’ research (Review of Business Programs, 1997). The government largely
rejected Mortimer’s prescriptions for CRCs.
Similarly, the Commission recommends that ‘given high associated
compliance costs under current arrangements, a complementary arrangement
to support smaller-scale and short-term collaborations between groups of firms
either independently or with universities and public sector research agencies
should be introduced’ (Productivity Commission, 2007). While this is an attempt
to address the issue that we have identified of high transaction costs within
CRCs, the Commission again fails to consider what alternative models of crosssector R&D collaboration (and Australia has several other schemes) can
appropriately support the expectations of the researchers involved.
Rather than relying on policy prescriptions based solely on econometric
analyses policy makers in Australia need to recognise that sustenance of the
‘knowledge resource base’ that underpin CRCs is a key concern. Once this is
accepted, learning from International experience with alternative forms of
sponsorship of ‘lighter’ cross-sector collaboration – such as prestigious,
industry-linked professorial chairs, or program such as the NSF GOALI scheme
that support personnel exchange between universities and industry – may also
be instructive.
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Notes
i
ii

http://backingaus.innovation.gov.au/2004/commercial/crc.htm
The key to the respondent codes shown in the text can be found in Table 1.
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